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“Peace Is More Than the End of Bombing”
The Second Stage of the Vieques Struggle
by
Sherrie L. Baver
The nature of colonialism in Puerto Rico has caused most political issues to
be viewed within the framework of status politics. In the first stage of the strug-
gle to expel the U.S. Navy from the island (1999–2003), civil society in Puerto
Rico united when the issues were reframed with links not to status politics but
to human rights and social justice. Viequenses symbolized for Puerto Ricans in
Puerto Rico, on the mainland, and in the world at large the costs of military
colonialism. In the second stage of the struggle, since the military’s departure,
Viequenses have struggled to control the future development of their commu-
nity as well as to clean up the toxic legacy of six decades of military maneuvers.
The important question with regard to this stage is whether civil society can
again rise above the institutionalized structure of colonial status politics to
advocate for social and environmental justice. Viewing the Vieques case within
the larger context of Puerto Rico’s dependent relationship on the United States
suggests that the struggle not only strengthened Puerto Ricans’ capacity to
determine their own future but also may have changed the calculus of
colonialism from Washington’s vantage point.
Keywords: Vieques, U.S. Navy, military colonialism, development,
decontamination
For over 500 years, Puerto Rico has served as a colonial outpost and garri-
son, first for Spain and then, since 1898, for the United States. From the early
1940s until recently, Vieques, a 51-square-mile island off the east coast of the
main island, served as a military base and a bombing range for the U.S. Navy
and Marines. Meanwhile, some 9,000–10,000 Viequenses were forced to
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share this tiny island with their military neighbor. Residents had been strug-
gling since the 1970s to force the navy out without success. In the 1990s,
however, the struggle gained new momentum partly because of the end of the
cold war and partly because of a reframing of the issues. By this time, orga-
nizers had moved away from the radical tactics and the rhetoric of imperialist
exploitation that had appealed to only a small part of the citizenry. With this
more moderate reframing, virtually all Puerto Ricans came to view the
Vieques struggle as one of social and environmental injustice, human rights,
continuing colonialism, and the disdain of federal officials (e.g., Barreto,
2002), and Viequenses succeeded in reclaiming their island in May 2003.
The coalition built within Puerto Rico, on the U.S. mainland, and internation-
ally was unprecedented. A concern in this article is whether this coalition can
be maintained for the next phase of the struggle, one aimed at ensuring
decontamination, devolution, improvement in health care, and sustainable
community development. This concern for the goals of the second stage pro-
vides a mantra for Vieques activists: “Peace is more than the end of bombing.”
While my focus is on the future of Vieques, the case cannot be fully under-
stood apart from the context of Puerto Rico’s colonial relationship with the
United States.1 The expulsion of the navy in May 2003 marked a significant
step in the growing capacity of Puerto Rican civil society and hence the deep-
ening of participatory democracy on the island. The momentum of the
Vieques victory has helped citizens to demand more than a continuation of
the stalemate in status politics on the island. This essay first provides an over-
view of the early decades of the struggle, the movement’s reactivation in the
1990s, and the eventual expulsion of the navy in 2003. It goes on to highlight
the specifics of the second stage of the struggle and then to raise concerns
about the danger of movement fragmentation, a common occurrence in the
poor communities in which struggles for environmental justice take place.
THE NAVY ON VIEQUES: A BRIEF HISTORY
Prompted by the perceived German threat in the Caribbean, the U.S. mili-
tary, which had been training on Culebra Island since 1902, expropriated
nearly three-quarters of Vieques in the early years of World War II. The navy
held onto its bombing range there for the next several decades as cold-war
tensions mounted. The takeover was facilitated by the community’s poverty.
Two sugar corporations controlled 71 percent of the land, while a few
wealthy families owned the rest. The degree of land concentration eased the
transfer of much of the island from private to federal government control
(Ayala, 2001). Construction of training facilities on Vieques proceeded by
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fits and starts linked with changing construction patterns at Roosevelt Roads,
the huge naval base being built on the main island east of Fajardo. In 1947
military planners reconfigured their designs for Roosevelt Roads and
Vieques to meet America’s new, postwar needs (Langley, 1985). More land
would now be needed on Vieques, and there was a second expropriation
involving over 4,000 acres in the eastern part of the island. After the initial
rise in construction jobs, the military presence in Vieques provided little
employment for desperate islanders. Troop visits to Vieques were too spo-
radic and brief to sustain a local service economy. Meager incomes were
supplemented by migrating for other work opportunities or fishing.
In 1970, in the midst of the Vietnam War, naval planners intensified their
bombing practice on Culebra and sought to evict residents to expand that
bombing range. This sparked a well-organized, militant, and ultimately suc-
cessful protest conceived as anticolonial struggle; the Culebra protest was
given much support by members of Puerto Rico’s independence movement
and its parties, the Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño (Puerto Rican
Independence party—PIP) and Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño (Puerto
Rican Socialist party—PSP). At least some of the energy mobilizing the
Culebra protesters came from resentment over conscription into the war
(McCaffrey, 2002).
As a result of its eviction from Culebra in 1971, the navy shifted its bomb-
ing practice to Vieques. While a few environmentalists warned of harm to
local coral reefs and coastal habitats in this fragile marine environment, fish-
ermen emerged as the key figures in this stage of the struggle. The bombing
caused serious damage to coral reefs and the fish that swam in the area, and
the increased numbers of navy vessels during training exercises frequently
severed buoy lines from traps, destroying fishing gear. Finally, on many days
of the year fishing was prohibited in waters that locals considered the best
fishing grounds around the island. Although these Viequenses tried valiantly
to stress the economic nature of their grievances, the navy, determined to hold
onto its range, was successful in casting the protesters as unpatriotic at best
and procommunist at worst. In 1983 Governor Carlos Romero Barceló
signed a memorandum of understanding with the navy to bring jobs to
Vieques and to mitigate the negative environmental impact of its training
operations, thus effectively stalling the movement for a decade.
The end of the cold war shifted the political terrain and offered new space
for organizing and issue framing. In this new historical space, activist
Vieques residents were able to enunciate their legitimate concerns against the
military without immediate accusations of anti-Americanism. Also, the pro-
test organizers of the 1990s chose to moderate their rhetoric and tactics in a
way that would allow for broad, nonpartisan support. Leaders considered it
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important to stress the creation of a blueprint for future land use on Vieques
without the military. The idea was to show islanders a future in which local
residents rather than wealthy off-island developers or real estate speculators
would control and benefit from the fruits of development.
The event that reenergized Vieques’s antinavy movement occurred in
1993, when the Clinton administration formed a federal commission on base
closures under Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. In response, Puerto Rican
activists created the Committee for the Rescue and Development of Vieques
(CRDV) with the goal of having Vieques included in discussions of the facili-
ties to be closed. Former Governor Carlos Romero Barceló, Puerto Rico’s
resident commissioner in Washington, recalling his failed efforts in 1983 and
recognizing the new moderation of Viequenses’ rhetoric and tactics, was
helpful at this stage.
The new focus of the movement on health and the environment was not a
surprising shift, since the negative health effects of the navy’s presence on
Vieques had been a local concern for years. A 1988 article in a Puerto Rican
engineering journal had documented the high concentrations of explosives in
the local drinking water (Cruz Pérez, 1988), and there was growing concern
about the frequency of certain types of cancer in the community.
However, military training on Vieques did not end in 1993. Although the
cold war was over, the navy did not lack an argument for remaining on the
island. The base was now judged essential for training for the Latin American
drug wars and activities in the Balkans and in the Middle East, and it was des-
ignated as the site of a $9-million radar installation to monitor the skies for
aircraft bound for the United States with illegal drugs. It was the struggle over
this proposal that laid the groundwork for the mobilization that finally
evicted the navy. While the first objections to the project were based both on
aesthetic grounds and on the possible health effects of electromagnetic radia-
tion, the health concerns proved to be the best way to mobilize a diverse
group of community residents. In 1994, when the navy announced its plans,
Vieques activists enhanced their political clout by joining with activists in
Lajas, which was also to have a radar installation. The Lajas protesters
stressed expropriation of agricultural land instead of health concerns. The
navy’s promotion of its project in the face of broad Puerto Rican opposition
led to one of the largest protests in recent Puerto Rican history in October
1995, but the navy completed the radar installation in 1998.
As often happens in collective action, a specific incident catalyzed years
of underlying tension and slow organizational movement. This incident was
the accidental death in April 1999 of David Sanes, a civilian who worked for
the navy as a security guard, when during training exercises two F-18s
dropped 500-pound bombs that missed their mark by a mile and a half. His
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death provided Puerto Rican human rights activists, peace activists, environ-
mentalists, and the citizenry at large with a visceral example of the injustice
of holding large-scale, live-fire military training exercises on a small, ecolog-
ically fragile island with more than 9,000 inhabitants. It served to galvanize
public support regardless of partisan loyalties for expelling the navy from
Vieques (Baver, 1993; Bliss, 2001). The ensuing protest became a relentless
civil disobedience campaign in which Puerto Rican activists and their allies
camped on military land for a year. Many progressive church groups (e.g., the
Puerto Rican National Ecumenical Movement) were involved in the struggle,
and even the mainstream religious denominations on the island, particularly
the Roman Catholic Church, supported the protesters against Washington’s
policies (Prats, 2003). In the United States, too, in addition to pacifist reli-
gious groups such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the American
Friends Service Committee, the United Church of Christ and the Methodists
gave support to the Vieques protesters.
After months of negotiations aimed at ending the Vieques demonstra-
tions, the White House agreed to withdraw the navy from the western side of
the island. President Bill Clinton issued an order in January 2000 to return the
entire area of the naval ammunition facility to civilian use, and on May 1,
2001, as part of the agreement, the navy returned 8,100 acres of land to local
and federal entities: 4,300 acres to the Municipality of Vieques, 3,000 acres
to the U.S. Department of the Interior (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), and
800 acres to the Puerto Rico Conservation Trust, a nonprofit group that main-
tains land in the public interest.
It took two more years for activists to expel the navy from Vieques, a pro-
cess that was slowed by the events of September 11, 2001, and the federal
government’s subsequent preoccupation with national security. It was not
until the end of 2002 that it became clear the Bush administration would
honor its commitment, made by the president on June 14, 2001, in
Gothenburg, Sweden, to have the navy leave Vieques entirely in 2003 (Gon-
zalez, 2001; García Passalacqua, 2002). However, on May 1, 2003, residents
of Vieques celebrated the navy’s departure from their island.
Specifically, what was transferred on that date to various entities was
14,669 acres on the eastern end of the island, including Camp García and the
900-acre bombing range. The bombing range was declared a “wilderness
area,” which means that public access is prohibited indefinitely because of
the real danger of unexploded ordnance (Congressional Research Service,
2004). Therefore, though the navy has ended its operations, about three-
fourths of the island remains under federal agency control. Not unlike other
decommissioned U.S. military facilities, most of this land has gone to the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to become a wildlife refuge. The National
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Defense Authorization Act of October 9, 1997 (P.L. 105–57), and its various
amendments, known informally as the Spense Act, permits former military
land to be used for conservation purposes but allows it to be reclaimed “if
necessary to facilitate military preparedness.” Vieques residents’ joy was
tempered by the awareness that they had to plan rapidly for the future devel-
opment of the community and the concern that the coalition that had risen
above partisan politics might not be able to maintain such unanimity of pur-
pose in the second stage of the struggle. Also important and unclear was
whether the Vieques activists could remain in the public eye for the less
dramatic and more technical battles to follow.
STAGE 2 OF THE STRUGGLE:
CLEANUP AND DEVELOPMENT
Stage 2 of the struggle represents contestation over several issues. First is
the return, or devolution, of all lands from federal control to the municipal or
commonwealth government. Linked to this are the issues of decontamina-
tion, addressing the perceived health crisis on the island, and controlling the
future development trajectory. For residents, it is apparent that the commu-
nity cannot be healed without progress on all of these issues.
DEVOLUTION AND DECONTAMINATION
The return of all lands held by the federal government to either the munici-
pality or the commonwealth was promised by President Clinton in his Janu-
ary 2000 directive (García Muñiz, 2001). The CRDV is also seeking an
amendment of the Spense Act to stipulate that the former live-impact area
will never again be used for bombing practice.
The issue of cleanup is fundamental to Vieques’s future development. The
2001 transfer agreement charged the navy with the “cleanup of the site
according to land use,” but this is not a straightforward process. Indeed, part
of the contention over western Vieques and, since 2003, over eastern Vieques
as well has centered on land-use designations. Land designated for residen-
tial use, for example, must be much more thoroughly cleaned up than land
intended for conservation purposes. On the western land, called “the clean
side” by local residents, roughly 15 potentially hazardous sites had been
studied by mid-2005, but the navy considered only 6 as probable candidates
for environmental remediation. Other than fencing in potential cleanup sites,
no remediation had actually taken place. The acreage given to the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service and the Conservation Trust had been only minimally
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remediated and, ironically (because of its potential contamination), had
become part of the Vieques National Wildlife Refuge.
The local community wants the land decontaminated to a level that would
allow recreational, farming, and other civilian uses for future generations
(Rivera and Cotto, 2002: Chap. 12). For example, unexploded ordnance
would have to be removed to a depth of 4 feet for land to be used for farming
and 10 feet for residential or commercial purposes (Colón, 2005). Since the
first land transfer in May 2001, local residents have demanded that the
cleanup standards should be determined by the Vieques community’s desired
land use, not the use decreed by the federal government. To push for this goal,
on November 24, 2002, the CRDV established an advisory committee on
environmental affairs made up of environmental lawyers, scientists, and
members of the community. It also called for help from established activist
networks in the United States that work with communities affected by mili-
tary contamination such as the Center for Public Environmental Oversight,
the Military Toxics Project, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation, which had
worked on decommissioned U.S. military bases in Panama.
As the primary strategy for decontamination, the CRDV and the common-
wealth government of Sila Calderón sought Superfund status for Vieques as
early as December 2002. Ultimately, Vieques and the waters surrounding
Vieques and Culebra were designated as a Superfund site in February 2005.
Culebra will likely be cleaned up by the army under another federal program.
Even with the Superfund designation, the cleanup could easily take a decade
(McPhaul, 2004). One knowledgeable EPA official has characterized the
Vieques remediation as “very complex”(interview, September 14, 2004).
HEALTH CARE
One reason the Vieques cause became so compelling to a wide range of
activists is the presence of significant health problems among long-time resi-
dents (CRDV, 2005a), including several types of cancer with rates signifi-
cantly higher than on the main island and high rates of asthma, skin prob-
lems, kidney failure, and heart abnormalities. Several academic studies have
revealed high levels of heavy metals in flora, fauna, and humans. From the
viewpoint of Viequenses, it is the six decades of military activities that has
left the heavy-metals residue on their island, caused the high cancer rate, and
contributed to the other problems (Fernández Colón, 2005; Colón, 2005,
Berman Santana, 2006). Vieques residents and their advocates have
expended much time and energy in the last several years trying to prove a
direct link between illness and the navy’s activities while the navy denies
responsibility.
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Part of the problem is at the level of paradigm. The navy employs a notion
of quantitative risk assessment that “transforms disputes over values and pol-
itics into scientific disputes that are inaccessible to many citizens and may be
particularly inaccessible for communities of color and lower incomes” (Rob-
erts and Toffolon-Weiss, 2001: 18). In this system, scientific findings will
always be contentious because the methods of data collection and findings
are rarely acceptable to both sides. Politics rather than science will continue
to be the key for resolving these disputes (see Beck, 1992; Wynne, 1996;
Fischer, 2000). Residents’ lifestyles are often blamed for the elevated rates of
specific diseases, and equally often the studies of the environmental arm of
the Centers for Disease Control, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Dis-
ease Registry (ATSDR), conclude that there is “no apparent public health
hazard.” Regarding Vieques, the ATSDR position has been that if the Puerto
Rican Cancer Registry had been updated when the navy withdrew in 2003,
the case for navy culpability for the illnesses would have been stronger. In
general, and not surprisingly, after undertaking numerous studies the agency
has found little evidence of contamination from navy activities in the air, soil,
or groundwater of Vieques (ATSDR, 2004).
There is little chance of agreement on an objective truth in environmental
justice struggles such as the one taking place on Vieques. A partial solution to
the problem is to improve health care on Vieques, and this has begun to occur.
It remains unclear whether the navy will pay compensation for past and pres-
ent health conditions linked to its activities. The matter may ultimately be
resolved in court, since many longtime residents are involved in a class action
lawsuit against the U.S. Navy (Masri, 2005).
DEVELOPMENT
Because of its history as a bombing range, Vieques is unique in the Carib-
bean in its relative lack of development. Since the navy’s departure, though,
the struggle over development on the island has come to parallel those going
on throughout the region. Here are small, densely populated islands, rich in
tropical rain forests, biodiversity, and prime beachfront real estate, where
land is a fiercely contested resource. The CRDV has a vision that it calls “sus-
tainable, community-controlled development,” but defining it is at the heart
of the development struggle. Viequenses are considering contending futures
for the island in terms of three related questions: Who will control Vieques’s
development, outsiders or the local community? Will tourism be the large-
scale enterprise common throughout the region or a smaller-scale, ecologi-
cally and culturally more sensitive version that would provide more benefits
to long-time residents? How “green” will Vieques be in the future? While the
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CRDV, for example, wants smaller-scale development than perhaps the
island government or off-island resort promoters, it may support more devel-
opment than do many ecologists and nature tourists, who see the National
Wildlife Refuge and six decades of nondevelopment as an unintended con-
servation gift from the U.S. military that makes Vieques unique among
Caribbean tourism destinations (Todd, 2003). While the CRDV supports
ecotourism, the return of much of the land that is now controlled by the fed-
eral government remains a long-term goal (CRDV, 2005b). Since the navy’s
pullout, stopping rampant land speculation has become an immediate issue
in Vieques. Real estate prices jumped dramatically after May 2003 as outsid-
ers looked for homes and businesses; it is not at all clear that longtime
residents have benefited from the boom.
Viequenses have at their disposal a comprehensive planning document
compiled between 1999 and 2002 by a group of Puerto Rican university
researchers and other professionals (Rivera and Cotto, 2002), but having a
planning document on paper does not guarantee its implementation. For
example, in the first months after the navy’s departure the municipality
allowed the development of a quarry, a project inappropriate both ecologi-
cally and aesthetically for an island trying to preserve its “paradise status.” At
the same time, however, Vieques’s mayor and the town council began to exert
some control over events. Several neighborhoods that had been “rescued” by
locals years earlier were formally taken over by the municipality as a way of
safeguarding them. The local assembly passed a law against the sale of public
land that carried a $10,000 fine and possible jail time. Local officials also
began to transfer property titles for a dollar to people whose land had been
expropriated in the 1940s. Importantly, in December 2004 the common-
wealth government ratified a master plan for Vieques’s future development
that supported the notion of sustainable community control (Estudios
Técnicos, 2004; Berman Santana, 2006). Still, as the CRDV grapples with
implementing the goals of the 2002 and 2004 plans, real estate speculation
continues.
In the time since the navy’s departure, business has improved markedly
for local merchants, guesthouse owners, and restaurateurs. In addition, the
commonwealth government has set up a program called Renacer Vieques, a
multisectoral strategy for addressing the island’s socioeconomic problems
that involves a pledge of $65 million for improving services and infrastruc-
ture and paying for land titles. Separate initiatives involve improving health
facilities, promoting agricultural programs for hydroponics cultivation,
expanding the fishing industry, rehabilitating housing, and improving
electrification.
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At present, three specific plans for Vieques funded by the commonwealth
government have been a source of contention in the community. The first
involves a recreational village for moderate-income Puerto Ricans. The
CRDV supports this project, but it has its opponents. One basis for opposition
is ecological— that the project would endanger turtles and bird sanctuaries.
More subtle but inherently elitist opponents argue that similar villages on
Puerto Rico’s main island have brought noise and drugs to small communi-
ties. Finally, some opponents prefer a mega-project proposed by outside
developers at Sun Bay Beach instead. A second plan involves a fisherman’s
wharf that would use nature-reserve land for an industrial fish-processing
complex and would include a pier and a gas station. Vieques residents have
protested that the stench and pollution would negatively impact tourism in
the town of Esperanza, and alternative sites have been suggested. A third plan
has already been implemented—the Wyndham Martineau Bay Resort,
Vieques’ first chain hotel, which opened in 2003 with a $40 million subsidy
from the commonwealth government. This is precisely the kind of project
opposed by the CRDV, which has called for the funding of locally owned
guesthouses and the renovation of potential heritage tourism sites. The tragic
loss of the rundown Frenchman’s House historic site in August 2005
underlines the urgency of renovation funds.
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The exclusion felt by Viequenses may even have been more palpable than
that perceived by other Puerto Ricans because they have long lived at the cen-
ter of military colonialism. Still, the navy’s departure in 2003 was a clear vic-
tory for all Puerto Ricans, who gained a heightened sense of nationalism and
anticolonialism through this struggle. As Barreto (2002: 86) has noted that
the Vieques crusade to get the navy out “galvanized public awareness and
collective action to a degree previously unseen in Puerto Rico. Solidarity on
this scale alarmed federal policy-makers accustomed to dealing with a soci-
ety deeply divided over political affairs. Nationalism, albeit in its cultural
variant, flourished to an unprecedented degree.” The concern now is that hav-
ing achieved the first goal of demilitarization, Vieques activists may not be
able to maintain sufficient support to achieve their just demands for decontami-
nation, devolution, health care, and sustainable community development.
The unanswered questions involve the degree of support for the second
stage of the struggle, the length and extent of the cleanup process, the possi-
bility of devolution, and the control of future development. Activists are con-
tinuing their press releases and occasional protests. At the end of May 2004,
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the CRDV demonstrated “to dramatize the urgent necessity for decontamina-
tion and the return of Vieques’s lands to its people,” and in May 2005 many
Viequenses rallied on the former bombing range against the open burning
and detonations being used to remove unexploded ordnance. Mostly, the
CRDV and other community groups are commenting on technical reports
issued by federal agencies. While such activity is essential for cleaning and
developing the island, it is unlikely to attract the 1999–2003 level of national
and international media attention.
The cleanup is likely to be long and slow. Various analysts point to
Kaho’olawe, Hawaii (an uninhabited island that the navy once used as a live-
impact range), as an appropriate comparison for estimating the time and
extent of the Vieques cleanup (Klein, 2001). On Kaho’olawe, the
remediation took over a decade, and the project was declared finished with-
out a complete cleanup. If the comparison is apt, then, at least in the short
term, a full cleanup with devolution to the municipal or commonwealth gov-
ernment is highly unlikely. Washington will not return land that contains
toxic and hazardous substances and unexploded ordnance. Additionally,
given its present concern with national security, the federal government is
unlikely to give up the option for military training on the island in the future.
Therefore, most of the former military lands that now comprise the Vieques
National Wildlife Refuge will probably remain in federal hands.
CONCLUSION
In Puerto Rico, social and political institutions and strategies are a mix of
traditions from the United States and from Latin America and the Caribbean.
Thus, in its struggle to gain control over the future of the community the
Vieques movement has borrowed and continues to borrow from both tradi-
tions. Environmental justice movements in Latin America and the Caribbean
typically link environmental issues to other concerns—most generally, inter-
national dependency or the negative aspects of economic globalization.
Especially in the Caribbean, environmental movements contest the use of
natural spaces for private, typically foreign tourism development and espe-
cially access to land on the coast (Lynch, 2006). The struggle over Vieques’s
tourism sector is typical of the contentious politics of development through-
out the Caribbean. In the United States, environmental justice activists are
especially concerned with cleanup and public health issues and focus on
remedies relying on civil rights legislation and class action lawsuits.
Vieques residents continue to need help from sympathetic activists in
Puerto Rico, on the mainland, and abroad. The challenge for the CRDV and
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other activists is to keep visible in this second stage, in which the issues are
much more technical than before and its undramatic labors are unlikely to
receive much media coverage. Viequenses must maintain their links to the
large community of activists in progressive networks that helped in stage 1.
In linking the Vieques situation to the larger context of Puerto Rico’s colo-
nialism, the continuing struggle has strengthened civil society on the island.
The number of protests and strikes in Puerto Rico in 2005, for example, sug-
gests that citizens have lost patience with their stalemated, divided govern-
ment and view the traditional political parties as increasingly irrelevant to the
island’s present reality. The Vieques struggle, which ended military colonial-
ism on the island, has not only strengthened Puerto Ricans’capacity to deter-
mine their own future but also changed the calculus of colonialism from
Washington’s vantage point.
NOTE
1. Residents of Puerto Rico do not vote in presidential elections, have one nonvoting resident
commissioner representing them in Congress, and are not fully covered by several federal social
welfare programs.
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